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TLID: What drew you into the public health arena?
PT: It goes back a long time. I first entered public health in 1974. The new specialty was called community medicine before changing its name to public health. My job was to develop and improve services for people with a disability, including elderly people and people with learning disability. I realised that there was a whole group of people out there who needed improvements in the services provided for them. Having come from teaching hospitals it was quite a shock to see the poor quality of vital community services and I realised that my skills were better tailored to try to improve things for people on the whole, rather than working with the individual. I found myself after a year or so chairing planning groups, and trying to encourage staff such as physiotherapists to get out in the community to support these people. I then went on the new MSc course in community medicine at Manchester University, which drew me into the inequalities in healthcare among other things, and I quickly realised that was where my skills were best applied, and I've been there ever since.
TLID: Of all the public health events you have had to deal with, what has been the most challenging, memorable, or even enjoyable?
PT: Public health is where I have been for nearly 30 years. I've worked at a community level, on things like community development, the real grass roots stuff. I did a lot of work on nutrition when I was working locally, and I ran one of the first food and health programmes in the country. It was memorable because I was heavily pregnant at the time. I recall us having a big food fair in Cambridge, where we had about 10 000 people. And then at a regional level we ran a big programme to improve standards in cancer, which involved around 1000 professionals, and nearly as many lay people and families. The whole concept of bringing so many people together, saying "how do you think cancer services should be improved", both for the professional and the user, I think again was relatively new, and that was quite satisfying. I was involved in Changing Child Birth and the Changing Child Birth implementation team was accountable to me. I led the work on paediatric intensive care. We took the best evidence available, and we used the same approach as we took for cancer-ie, what a child and parent expect when they go into intensive care, what kind of standards should they expect, and then building a service around this. 5 years on the service has changed to match the strategy that we came up with.
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carcasses, which we monitored for a year, so I think the advice and the monitoring we put into place worked very well.
Then of course the thing that really hit us was the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, and I suppose if I look back over the last 4 years that's been the most significant event. We opened up our operations room on September 12, and we worked solidly to prepare and support the Department of Health and the National Health Service in how we might respond should there be an incident here, and that has stayed as a dominant issue for the last 2 years. That event helped to push the formation of the Health Protection Agency (HPA). Last year I chaired the steering group to establish the agency, and spent most of the year promoting, supporting, and encouraging it. I hadn't intended to apply for the job as Chief Executive, and I didn't apply for it to start with. In the end it was so important to me, setting up this new public health infrastructure, I decided that I would like to see it through, so here I am. It's been a very varied journey, from inequalities to health promotion to acute services, but that's the beauty of public health; it's the sort of job where you move around. Some people go in to their consultant posts and stay there for years, but I've changed jobs about every 5 years, and it's been fascinating. I've never been bored.
TLID: As the Chief Executive of the UK's new HPA, could you tell us what the role involves?
PT: At the moment I am trying to establish it, bringing together several organisations, and in particular creating the local-regional service, to work alongside a national service. That to me is a fundamental change. A lot of these organisations have different histories, different cultures, different ways of working, so turning that into one organisation dedicated to health protection, focused on communities, patients, and the public's perception, is my primary role at the moment. A part of that process is leading the strategy-where should we be going, what are the key issues in public health and health protection? Then taking these issues to a non-executive board and working with them to make sure we are tackling the big issues. We've been working on a corporate plan, which we will publish in the near future, but at the moment it's really about creating the organisation, and trying to drive the strategy.
TLID: Given that infectious diseases has no borders, would it not have been better for the HPA to be UK-wide initiative?
PT: Because health in the UK is devolved, and the CMO for England cannot announce a UK body, we started off talking about proposing it for England. The Welsh decided they wanted to come in at the beginning, so we set up an England and Wales body. Our colleagues in Scotland and Northern Ireland have been reviewing their situation. We already work closely with them, and the HPA does provide specialist support for both of those countries, because we did that before. We did it for chemicals, for some of our reference laboratory work, and of course we are working in close partnership with the National Radiological Protection Board who provide a UK-wide service. The Scottish authorities are in consultation to decide how they want to run things, and what they want from the agency, and how that will work. We are hoping that they will come up with a plan as soon as possible, following their elections. In Wales, for example, what they have done is create a new public health service for Wales, which is managing their local services. They want to work in partnership with our local services but the specialist services go across both countries. PT: I think there are a number of different benefits that are already being realised. If we take infectious diseases for example, we have the services at Colindale, and at Porton Down. For modelling future scenarios, such as an influenza pandemic, both Colindale, and Porton Down are centres of expertise. Being one organisation does make it easier for people to work together. This brings benefits on a the national level, but I think one of the most significant advantages is the benefit of having a local team, a regional team, and the national centres. One of our teams in the north west region was saying that by creating a local team with an identity, the people around them found it much easier to work with the team because they are easily identifiable and working within a specific context. Before people worked as individuals, and if the Environment Agency, the local authority, or the local primary care trust didn't know the individuals, they didn't always know who to go to, but now they do. In addition the local population now has a health protection team to respond to their needs. The local team set up their own website, which links into the national HPA website. Interestingly, the number of hits to the website has gradually increased because the local population have known where to go for their health protection and advice. So its created an identity, which I think at the local level has been very helpful.
With the HPA, we now we have that local level directly linked into the national centres, as well as a regional network of health protection. It is very powerful and backed up immediately by expertise. Now when we look at any subject, we automatically include someone from the local team, the regional team, the laboratories, the national centres, and immediately and quickly you have all the expertise you need across the subject. This is a very powerful tool when managing infectious diseases. A similar approach is being used for chemicals.
When you look across radiation, chemicals, and infections, for many of the issues-whether it be modelling, risk assessment, risk management, risk communication, surveillance, or looking at long-term issues-you start to find the synergies already there. Even in the short time we've been going, it already seems that people are learning from each other, and I'm really encouraged by how much people are suddenly realising the gain of being part of something.
For the staff, where we have a large number of scientists, for example, they can see wider career options. Within the public health faculty new trainees coming in can see quite an exciting future, too; so I think for recruitment and retention it will be really good for people's careers. There is a huge amount of enthusiasm. There have been concerns from the laboratories, and I know that and I've spent a lot of time working with people on that issue, but if you look across the breadth of public health most people were enthusiastic.
TLID: How has the NHS taken to the 30 PHLS laboratories being brought under its management?
PT: What we've tried to do is put things in context. If you go back to when the PHLS was set up, which was 50-60 years ago, the NHS did not exist. Today we have between 200 and 300 NHS laboratories, and what we want is for all the laboratories to be doing clinical and public health research. It was inappropriate to have 31 laboratories in the HPA, and more than 200 in the NHS; they should all be together. The HPA's role is to be the specialist support, and not to do all the health protection. The primary care trust, the NHS trust, and local authorities do the majority of health protection and are backed up by our specialist support.
I do understand why colleagues in the PHLS felt that they were losing a network that was strong to begin with. The challenge now is to create stronger networks across each region and then to link those networks up, and we are doing that in a number of ways. One is by appointing the public health microbiologist at the regional level to drive that programme. Then we are looking at each of the local teams to draw in their local microbiology laboratory as part of the local health protection network. We are hoping that that way we will be able to build up local networks and regional networks of all the laboratories. What we need to look at is the strength that was in those PHLS laboratories, not to lose it, but help to use that as a basis to build those wider networks. We've continued to put funding into those laboratories so that way we don't lose the good things that came from that laboratory. I know the anxieties that people feel and they have expressed them very strongly to me, but I hope that as time goes on they will see that actually it is going to work and the vision is not false.
TLID: Since the CMO's announcement of the new agency, restructuring has happened very quickly. Was that the plan?
PT: My own view is if you are going to make a change, you do it quickly. The worst thing in change is uncertainty, and I know because I've been in the NHS and regional offices through many changes. To me, if a change is going to occur, people want it done quickly so they know where they are.
TLID:
Reports from the National Audit Committee on the UK's bioterrorism preparedness plans have concluded that some parts of the response are ready while they were still gaps in our preparedness should an attack occur. Furthermore there have been reports that UK physicians do not feel confident of responding in an emergency since they don't feel adequately trained. In your view how prepared are we? PT: We can always do more, but I go to European committees on this issue, and we are still way ahead of most other countries that I know, and that's because we have got a NHS, and I think a stronger public health system alongside it, and that is the bedrock of the response. But part of the rationale for pushing the HPA forward was to help drive the programme, and we've set up an emergency response division so we do now have a dedicated resource for it.
One of the major programmes this year is the training programme. I always put up a number of principals for emergency planning, and one is that you build on what you know and I think some people forget this. They think that they are going to have to learn something new, but an accidental chemical release or a deliberate one doesn't make any difference to the way you treat people; it's all the same. Obviously there is a security dimension. But from a clinical point of view many of the issues are very similar. The way that, for example, we responded to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) could be the same for any other disease. If it had been a deliberate, we would have made the same kind of response. When
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The second principal is to have the infrastructure and we have a very good infrastructure, and the HPA strengthens that infrastructure by having an integrated public health system. The third thing is to do the training, to give people the tools for the job. What the UK does have is a very good supply of countermeasures, which has been built up, and is very well deployed.
What we've done so far is to try and target consultants of communicable disease in the community, the infectious diseases physicians, and emergency consultants. Training groups for these individuals have been over-subscribed; and rightly so, these are the groups of healthcare professionals that need to know.
TLID: In recent years the UK has been the scene of several public health controversies including BSE, foot and mouth, and measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine. Now we have SARS, a global outbreak where public health, industry, and the economy have fallen prey to the disease and the fears it has raised. What concerns you about finding the right balance to respond to SARS in the UK? PT: Firstly, I'd like to say that the MMR debate has settled down quite a bit. Despite the huge barrage of adverse publicity, uptake is still in the 80% range, which is higher than many other countries. I think the fact we have held it at that level shows good common sense among the majority of parents.
I think part of the reason for having the HPA, is so that we can stand back and try and give objective, impartial advice. We have been working from day one-from when SARS was announced to the international communityto try and understand the science, and work with a range of experts around the country to make sure that we give objective scientific advice to the Department of Health. I think on the whole we have got the balance about right at the moment. The most important thing seems to be identifying infected people early. Quite a lot of cases have been referred to us, most of which have turned out not to be anything to do with SARS, but its better they are referred to us than not. We've had six probable cases, but diagnosis is difficult, so we've had to assume it on a clinical basis, not on a microbiological one.
I think being part of the huge international effort has been very important. Our laboratory in Colindale is one of the WHO laboratories, its one of the few working on the SARS virus. Being part of that international effort allows us to say "look, this is the science, these are the measures" and then implement a policy immediately. I think at the moment we are about right in our response, but we assess it daily. Within the HPA Angus Nicoll has been leading a lot of work from the surveillance side of things, and Maria Zambon has done a huge amount of work on the diagnostic side. We have someone in Toronto and Geneva at the moment, and are trying to make sure that we are completely up to date with events.
We've done some scenario planning for the futures so that we are well placed to respond fast. But it is a balance, because over-reaction can damage peoples' confidence. If you over-react and nothing happens, people become very sceptical. It is a balance, and I think at the moment we've got it about right. TLID: A call for a European Union (EU) centre for infectious diseases has been made by the EU commissioner, David Byrne. Do you think such an organisation is required in Europe?
PT: I think something is needed, but there are different views of what kinds of centres should exist. I think things like SARS, and other infectious diseases show that having some coordination is very important, particularly in the EU where the free movement of goods and people are part of every day life. So it's very important that for some things we work in a very coordinated way. But there is a lot of expertise in a number of different institutions throughout Europe, and to try and replicate or replace those I think would be wrong. I think it needs to be much more of a hub and spoke organisation, where there is a way of coordinating and supporting all the networks.
There are some very good surveillance networks. Where they have struggled a bit is in management and coordination. So far this has depended a lot on the good will of a few people. So I do think there is a need for something more structured. I would not like to see a major centre though-we don't need that. Because if you add up the expertise in Europe it's terrific, it's more than one Centres for Disease Control. I know not everybody in Europe has that view, but certainly in the UK that's our preferred model. PT: I would like us to have a strong international role, because I think the level of expertise we have, should be shared internationally. We do a lot already, the WHO collaborations for example, but I'd like to formalise that more. I see that as our role. To do that obviously we need to get some dedicated funding, because to release people from small teams is quite hard, and our prime source of funding from the Department is to support the NHS. We do have other sources of money and income and we are going to review all our international work to see how we can plug this money into the international community in a more effective way. I will be looking to see if we can find more resources, and to offer training, because with our level of expertise I think we have a responsibility to helping the global community. The SARS thing has shown that if you have a united international effort you will have a greater chance of beating the problem.
